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Summary
This paper examines the question of optimal patent duration under different
conditions of rivalry in the market for invention. As in previous studies on
this subject, a static technological environment is assumed. Unlike earlier
studies, however, the present paper permits the patent winner to further develop
its invention if such additional expenditures are privately desirable. The
results show that invention markets characterized by rivalry have shorter optimal
patent lives than markets with monopoly inventors, a result counter to the find-
ings of previous studies where all project specific R&D expenditures stopped upon
conferral of the patent.

It is well known that the growth of inputs cannot, alone, explain
overall output growth. A significant factor in explaining output growth
is technical advance. Production functions are constructs that rest on
an assumption of given technology; technical advance results in attractive
shifts in most production functions. For many years, economists relegated
technology as a parameter and thus examined the performance of economic
systems by resource allocation among the variables of land, labor and
capital.
The lack of attention to the production of new technology was
somewhat tinders tandable; technical improvements are essentially new
knowledge and the price system has well known problems in dealing effi-
ciently with such a "commodity." Technical advances are, for the most
part, costly to arrive at but inexpensive to duplicate.
Findings by such authors as Schmookler (1966) pointed out the
lack of good explanatory power the theory of the firm had with respect
to technical advance; profit making firms were undertaking sizable
amounts of research and development. Such allocation of resources toward
something previously modeled as a parameter pointed to the need for more
developed theory.
Much work has been directed at determining the relative efficiency
of various market structures in the allocation of resources toward in-
vention. It is not the direct purpose of this paper to make such
examinations. An extensive survey of these studies has been provided
by Kamien and Schwartz (1975), While the conclusions are not entirely
clear, it seems certain that no single market structure results in a
Pareto efficient allocation of resources to research and development
(R&D).
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In light of this, certain "second best" procedures must be examined.
Social controls may provide an attractive method toward lessening the
inefficiencies described above. While government subsidies for R&D and
award programs exist, the most prevalent form of social control is the
patent system. By its very nature, a patent brings monopoly problems
into the allocation of resources but the arguments for turning to a
second best solution have already been given. Awarding the inventor
a monopoly on the use of his discovery for a specified period of time
eliminates the free rider problem, thus restoring the incentive to invent.
Extension of the duration of protection will increase incentives for
private resource allocation into technical advance. Unfortunately,
extension of patent protection definitionally brings with it the
social inefficiencies recognized in a monopolistic market. The inter-
action of these two opposite forces implies a trade-off and the exis-
tence of an optimal patent life.
Studies of optimal patent life have not been numerous. Nordhaus
C1969) examined the question with a formulation similar that first ad-
vanced by Arrow (1962). Assuming no competition in the inventive process,
Nordhaus posits a concave production function relating inventive benefits
to R&D expenditures, which he then uses to maximize a social welfare
function, Scherer (1972) developed a partial geometric interpretation of
the Nordhaus model, depicting private benefits and costs while neglecting
to present the alterations that consumer surplus has on the geometry,
Kamien and Scwartz (1974) bring in the realistic assumption of rivalry
in the inventive process, and find a longer optimal patent life than
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Nordhaus. However, their results are sensitive to two contestable assump-
tions: innovation stops at the awarding of the patent and the degree of
rivalry is exogenously determined. The latter appears to be a method-
ological error; in a study directed at finding the optimal patent life,
it is important to recognize that altering the length of patent protec-
tion will result in larger expected valve to the patentee and thus more
intensive rivalry. It can be argued that the former assumption, that
the invention innovation project size is a once for all decision, is
unrealistic in the general sense.
Once the winning firm has been awarded the patent, it is not allowed
to go on to develop the patent to its full potential; the invention model
has a putty-clay nature with respect to R&D, Since each firm prior to
the conferral of the patent chooses its project size according to an
expected private benefit necessarily smaller than the actual private
benefit of a winner it will choose a project size smaller than a monopoly
inventor. Once the "winner" has been determined, it should act as a
monopolist in that it sees the total benefit and cost, not the discounted
benefits. In fact, experience has shown that this is the general case
in real world innovation examples.
A useful analogy presents itself. In the classic Cournot model,
as the number of firms Increases, the Individual firms output, q.,
decreases while market output, Q, increases from the monopoly level.
In the Kami en and Schwartz model, increases in rivalry bring about
decreasing project size for the individual firm; however, since there
is only one winner who cannot develop its patent further due to the
putty-clay nature of the model, the market project size also decreases.
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Unlike the Coumot model, society sees no benefit from increased com-
petition, only a diminished level of technical change.
The effect of rivalry then is to diminish the size of the improve-
ment. In reality, while there may be some examples of putty-clay pro-
cesses, we would expect the winner of a patent to continue development
to the private optimum just as a Nordhaus monopoly inventor. As a
restilt of their specifications, Kamlen and Schwartz find the optimal
patent life is longer when rivalry is present. Intuitively, since the
degree of rivalry is exogenous, longer patent protection inflates pri-
vate benefits somewhat offsetting rivalry's effect on project size,
without altering the degree of rivalry and duplicative costs of the
losers, which they incorrectly assume is exogenous to the model.
This paper will examine the issue of patent life and market struc-
tion using a different assumption. Rivalry will be specified as an endo-
genous f\inction of the level of profits going to the winner. The inven-
tion-innovation scenario is a two stage process. The first stage is the
competition to win the initial patent; the second stage allows the patent
winner to continue to develop its invention just as would a monopoly
inventor. Three conditions will be satisfied in arriving at the optimal
patent life under rivalry: private profit maximization, social welfare
maximization, and a zero expected profit eqiiilibrlum condition. We
arrive at an optimal patent life shorter than the Nordhaus monopoly
inventor model whereas Kami en and Schwartz found the optimal patent life
to increase as one moves out of the monopoly situation.
Finally, we should note two other assumptions at the outset. The
potential benefit, both private and social, of the inventor is assumed to
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be of the "manna" type; that is, it suddenly appears and/or becomes known
to the potential inventor. This is in contrast to models where the bene-
fits are growing over time, or costs shrinking due to increased knowledge,
making profitability a function of time. Such models will be examined
in the subseqeunt essay. Additionally, timing factors are taken to be
exogenous parameters in the present study. Granted, the timing of intro-
duction decision is a key element in Kami en and Schwartz' analysis.
However, they find (Kamien and Schwartz (1972), p. 10) that the effect
of rivalry on timing is ambiguous. Additionally, Ippolito has shown
that the direction of bias introduced by specifying timing factors exo-
genoxisly is, a priori, indetermlnant (p. 2). Thus, it does not appear
that making such timing considerations endogenous would greatly alter
the results.
Section I will present a generalized model of the Nbrdhaus monopoly
inventor scenario with a more useful geometric interpretation than pre-
sently put forth. The second section will examine the effects of rivalry
on the situation.
I. MONOPOLY INVENTOR MODEL
In this section we consider a market for invention with no rivalry;
the firm proceeds, with certainty, toward some inventive goal secure in
the knowledge that it has no competition for this goal. Hie firm sells
a final product in a competitive market. The invention is of the pro-
cess improvement variety. While product inventions are not explicitly
treated, one can imagine such invention as finally achieving costs low
enough to warrant introduction of a product that has always been "de-
manded .
"
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A. A Simple Model of Invention
Consider a market with demand and costs as shown in Figure 1. The
private firm can invest in R&D expenditures to introduce a process im-
provement that lowers unit production costs. We assume that the effec-
tive R&D expenditures, I, are scaled in dollars so that the marginal
cost of an extra unit of inventive input is a constant number, which
we set at 1. That is, the variable I represents an efficient use of
resources in its "production." We assume that the improvement is not
so major as to result in an Increase in quantity by a profit maximizing
patent monopolist: the so called "rxm-of-the-mill invention" (Nordhaus,
1969) • Improvements lower MCq to MC, in Figure 1, earning the patent
2holder returns of a as he charges royalty rate MC^ - MC^,
Assume that a is an increasing concave fimction of the level of I
and the size of demand, which we assume to be constant and suppress for
the time being. A larger R&D project, i.e. larger I, will resvilt in a
more dramatic improvement. That is to say, a larger I will cause an
even greater reduction in marginal production costs, which increases the
area a in Figure 1. The inventor realizes a present dlscoxmted value
of
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where r is the dlscovmt rate and T Is the government administered patent
3
protection period. We assume that the patent holder licenses out
the process at a negligible transaction cost, thus avoiding any adjust-
ment costs and transition periods between the time he receives the patent
4
and when he earns full monopoly rents. Additionally, at time T + e the
property rights to the invention become public and any firm can produce
at MC, . The users no longer p^ royalties and competition drives the
price down to MC^.
Maximizing present discounted value by setting dV/dl = gives
fT
C2) a' (I) e~^^dt -1=0
which can be solved for the profit maximizing level of R&D, I*. In
Figure 2, this is represented by the intersection of the MC = 1 and the
curve P at the level I*, here P is defined as the first term in (2),
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Tuming to the social benefits from invention, we need to examine
the change in consumer surplus due to the introduction of the technical
advance. By assumption, price does not change until time period T.
Denoting the deadweight loss triangle as 5(1), where 6' > and 6" <
we have the change in consumer surplus
= r (a(
Jt
ACS
I
I*) + 6(I*))e""dt
'T
where the social discount rate is assumed to be equal to the private
rate.
Finally, under the usual assumption, we will take social welfare
as the efficiency measure of net surplus, W = PS + CS, recognizing the
arguments sometimes voiced against such an asstjmptlon. Later it will
be shown that changing the relative weights of CS and PS in W does not
change the qualitative conclusions of the model. Recall that we are
neglecting any possible external benefits of the patented Invention and/or
the patenting process itself.
Thus we have
(3) W =
I
a(I*)e"^^dt + [ 6(I*)e"'"dt - I*.
I I
T
This can be depicted in Figure 2 as the area under the curve S but above
MC = 1, where s is the marginal social benefit cxnrve:
(4) S = a' (I)
I
e"^^dt + S'(I) f e""dtJq Ji
In Figure 2 we know that the change in consumer surplus due to invention
is the area below S but above P while the additional present discounted
value to the firm from inventive activity is the area below P above
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marginal cost. Unconstrained, society woiold like to move out to the
intersection of S with MC, but the fact that private firms do not
recognize the additional consumer benefits from R&D leads to investment
at a lower level. As mentioned in the introduction, we are forced into
a second best situation.
%
rAC
FIG. a
Examination of the effects of a change in patent life is possible.
If the patent life is shortened, T is decreased. From (2) and (4) it
is obvious that such a decrease in T will lower P for any I while raising
6, A new, lower I* is arrived at, as shown in Figure 3, PS drops by
the area A + B, However, CS increases by the area A + D - C, Net change
-10-
%
i: i:
FIG. 3
in welfare Is D - C - B; the area A is a loss to the private firm offset
by a gain in consumer surplus. If this net change Is positive, we should
continue to shorten the duration of patent protection.
This simple model allows a more complete geometric interpretation
of the Nordhaus model. Unlike Scherer's geometry, we can depict the
social benefits and the second best nature of the I* arrived at even
under optimal choice of patent life. However, the above model only
shows the direction of beneficial changes in patent life. To better
show the optimal T we now turn to a more general model.
B. A Generalized Model of the Monopoly Inventory Case
Consider an invention market with only one participant. The R&D
investment will result in a process invention yielding present discounted
value of extra profits in the production and sale of the industry's
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output of R dollars when developed at time t = 0. The exact amount of
this extra revenue depends upon the level of effective R&D expenditures,
I, and on the duration of protection from some other firmCs) use of your
idea/invent ion. In the present concern, this protection is in the form
of a patent. However, we can imagine the given industry without the
government protection device. Most likely, there will be a period of
A
natural protection, T, representing any imitation lag caused by such
things as secrecy, etc. While the size of T will vary across industries,
it is certainly bounded on the low side by zero. In any industry, if
A
patent life is less than T, then such a patent life is not relevant;
no firm would take out a patent and reveal all the information as to its
invention if the secrecy route led to a larger protection period. That
is, optimal patent life is bounded by the value of T in the specific
A
case, as will be shown later. For the present, assume that T = 0,
This will be relaxed shortly. Thus we have revenue from inventive
activity:
R = R(I,T).
Specifically, we assume that R is an increasing concave fimction
of the level of inputs
R^ > R^^ < Rj^R^ - 2RiT >
and at time T + e the extra revenues to the patent holder vanish as
competitors drive the price of the industry product down to the new
lower cost of production, as explained in part A,
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The firm faces a cost schedule, C(I) which we assume to be of the
general form
C > 0, C" >_ 0.
Finally, assume the patent holder collects all returns to the patent
over its lifetime; that is, imitation is not permitted. This is not
unreasonable, given the monopoly position of the inventor in the first
place.
The firm will maximize the present discounted value of the profit
from inventive activity,
(5) TT = R(I,T) - C(I).
Using (5) it is possible to construct a reaction function for the firm,
relating its profit maximizing level of I to any specific level of patent
protection. Totally differentiating (4) and setting this equal to zero,
we can solve for dl/dT which is the slope of an isoprofit contour in I,
T space.
(6) dl/dT
^-4
If we call I* the privately determined profit maximizing level of I
given some T we know the denominator satisfies
>
_ _
<
>
Rj - C- - as I f I*
Since the numerator of (6) is always positive, we know the slope of the iso-
profit curves is
dT 7 *« ^ 7 I*
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A representative isoprofit map is depicted in Figure 4. The reaction
function is the locus of vertical slope points on the isoprofit map.
From (5) we know that IL. - C^ = if the firm is maximizing profits.
As T is varied, this maximization condition determines how the firm
must alter I. This gives a "demand" curve relationship of I to T.
Differentiating this with respect to T we can find the slope of the
reaction function is positive. Letting I* = g(T) represent this reaction
function and recalling that T = 0, we have private optimization as shown
in Figure 5,
FIG.M
T
Fl&. 5
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Govemment and Social Welfare
The government enters as the second party in the model. The vari-
able under its control is the duration of patent protection. It maxi-
mizes a social utility function, U, The government acts as a Stackelberg
leader, setting T to maximize U given the knowledge of the private
reaction function constraint.
We specify social utility as a fxmction of the net surplus from
invention:
U = U(S,P)
where S is the addition to consumer surplus and F is the addition to
producer surplus that results from Introduction of the new process.
Since both S and P are functions of the level of R&D expenditures and
the length of patent protection we can write the indirect utility fvmc-
tion
C7) U = U[S(I,T),P(I,T)]
Working again in I,T space, the social Indifference map can be
constructed. Following the lead of others, we make the assun?)tion that
P and S enter the social utility function linearly. While recognizing
the problems inherent in imposition of such a restrictive assumption,
we make it merely for e£ise of exposition. As is pointed out in Appendix
A, all results are qualitatively tmchanged for any weighting of consumer
surplus at least as heavily as producer surplus. If the weight given to
P was made stronger, we would eventxially reach the point where private
and social benefit coincide.
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Ob\'lously, as long as patent protection is not infinite in duration,
any increase in I will lead to larger consumer surplus effects as we will
eventually see a fall in prices due to the improved technology. Addi-
tionally, we know that for any level of T there exists some I* which
maxLmlzes private discounted profits from invention.
Formally, we have established that, given some T,
Sj. > VI
Pj J as I J I*
S(0,T) = P(0,T) = 0.
The final line is obvious as S and P are defined as incremental surpluses
caused by R&D expenditures, 1. Note that this expression ln^>lies no
indifference curve meets the horizontal (T) axis.
Holding T constant, as we move vertically through I,T space we move
through larger iso-utility curves up to the point where S^ + P^ = 0;
further increases in I result in smaller valued iso-utility curves. To
see this, differentiate (7);
du = Sj.dl + Pjdl + S^dT + P^dT
Now, if we are moving vertically through (I,T) space, dT = 0, That is,
which implies increasing utility up till the point where P^ has not only
become negative, but exactly offsets the S^; define this as I**(T.), On
the other hand, given some level of I, we know that social utility is
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maximized by a patent period of T = 0. Recall that consumer surplus is
producer surplus plus the additional triangle realized when price drops
at the expiration of patent protection. This implies that a shortening
of T increases consumer surplus by the size of the decrease in producer
surplus plus the additional triangle gained. That is.
S^ < 0, P^ > VT
(S^ + P^) <
These results combine to give us a social indifference map such as the
one pictured in Figure 6, Indifference curves closer to the vertical
axis, (i,e., the innermost curves) correspond to higher levels of utility,
li* is a bliss point for this industry, since even with T = 0, we have an
I < " which maximizes U(S,P) given the cost of I,
-o
FlC.
Mathematically, we can totally differentiate (7) and set dU = to
find the slope of. the indifference curve as
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*•
'' dT ~ UgS^ + UpP^
Again, assuming U- and Up are of eqiial size, the sign of (8) is such that
~ > for I < I**(T^)
^ < for I > I**(T^)
where I**(T.) is defined as the socially optimal level of I for the
given T.
C9) Sj.(I**(T^)) + Pj.(I**(T^)) =
Combining the social indifference map with the private reaction
fimction in I,T space gives the configuration as shown in Figure 7. As
is proven in Appendix A, the socially optimal ridge line has negative
slope. Additionally, since
Pt > I < I*(T.)
I 1
Pj = I = I*(T.)
Pj. > I < I*(Tp
Sj. > VI
we know by (9) that I**(T.) is always greater than I*(T ), As T
approaches infinity S approaches zero implying that the I** locus and
the I* locus asymptotically approach each other.
Acting as the Stackelberg leader, the government can vary patent
life policy to maximize the constrained social welfare. The optimal
patent life for the case depicted in Figure 7 is T*. However, this
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assumed that T = 0; the only protection available was govemmeiit patent
protection. Now let us relax this assumption.
If Tj. > then the reaction fttnction g(T) is truncated at the low
A A
side by T_; intuitively, a patent life less than T- wovild be reflective
as firms in this industry could rely upon natural protection from imita-
tion for a longer period of monopoly returns. The reaction function
becomes, in effect, vertical at T_ as is shown in Figure 8.
Rs. 7
However, the indifference map was also sensitive to industry condi-
tions and as such will also be altered if T > 0. Imagine the industry
A
depicted in Figure 7, where T = 0. Figure 9 shows a representative
indifference curve; a loctis of Cl»T) combinations that gives utility
A
U^. Now, for any reason, let T_ > be the natural protection period.
By the same logic as above, this iiqjlies that if T is lowered below !„,
we stay at utility level Uq only by holding I at I. That is, all
indifference curves become horizontal lines between T = and T-. It
-19-
FiG. S
shovild be recalled that we are assuming away any external effects that
may arise from the fact that patenting Increases society's knowledge
immediately and this may lead to further opportunities to invent else-
where .
Finally, some general observations about the effect of T > on
the socially optimum patent life. If the socially optimal T*, determined
where the reaction function g(T) is tangent to the innermost indifference
curve, is larger than T. Cthe natural protection period for industry i)
nothing is altered. Such a situation is shown in Figure 9.
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The dotted lines depict how the ciirves wovild appear if T. = 0,
On the other hand, some industries have conditions which permit
innovators to achieve rents sufficient to induce significant levels of
R&D with no patent protection. These industries may have a T. > T*.
In this case, a comer solution arises, as is depicted in Figure 10.
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The optimal protection period, T*, is less than what the firm is allowed
by natural imitation lags, etc., in its industry. Society made worse
off (U, < Up.) as the price decrease effect is farther away than optimal.
At this comer solution, patent life is, effectively, zero for this
A
industry as T. maximizes the constrained welfare.
Finally, you will note that all private reaction functions have be-
come positive in I at T values of e > 0, In fact, we may have industries
where the costs of R&D are large and/or imitation is very very easy.
Such a situation is depicted by a very low, perhaps zero, value of T.
and a reaction function g(T) that has a hoirizontal intercept at T > 0.
That is, g(T) = for < T <_ Y and g' (T) > 0. As shown in Figure 11, this
alters the indifference map in a way similar to the situation where
T > T*. For any level of T < T, there is no private R&D expenditure
forthcoming. Thus, as we vary T. where < T. < T we must hold I constant
-22-
if we are to stay at any given level of utility. Thus, the indifference
curves, once again, become horizontal. This is due to the specification
of utility in the indirect form: a function of consumer and producer
surplus. Regardless, the industry in Figure 11 will have an interior
solution at a positive patent life.
r
flC w
Thus, we see that not all industries need patent protection to
bring forth the (second best) optimal R&D projects; this is as has been
argued by some previous author's empirical work [see, for example,
Scherer (1969)], Industries such as those depicted in Figure 11 require
certain restrictions to allow the invention form to recoup its costs
and reward its initiative. On the other hand. Figure 10 showed the case
where optimal patent life was zero. Intuitively we can imagine an in-
dustry where patent protection is not important; natural protection is
longer than the socially optimal patent protection absent any T > 0.
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II. RIVALRY IN THE INVENTION MARKET
In the preceeding analysis, we operated under the assumption of a
monopoly inventor. In this section we add more realism by dropping this
rather restrictive assumption. In most if not all cases of invention,
the recipient of the patent is not the only party to have worked toward
gaining patent rights on the specific invention. The winner of the patent
will gain monopoly rents which more than offset its e:q)endlture on win-
ning the patent. The losers will get nothing out of their efforts except
the loss of expenditures invested in the losing cause. However, the
expenditures represent a cost to society which must be considered in
our social welfare maximization process.
Kamien and Schwartz (1974) examined the optimal patent life under
condition of rivalry. As in this model, the potential inventors recognize
the existence of private benefit from a patented Invention. Kami en and
Schwartz (K-S) specify a concave benefit function as in Nordhaus.
Rivalry removes any certainty that the potential inventor will realize
the monopoly returns; the expected return to any individual rival will
be smaller than if it were a monopoly inventor.
At this point, two specifications in the K-S model become very impor-
tant. First, in their model the winner of the patent is not allowed to con-
tinue development of the invention. Given the lowered expected return
brought about by rivalry, the R&D goal of the firm is lower than that of a
monopoly developer. By designing the development process such that it
halts at the level of R&D which achieves the patent, K-S have made the
process putty-day in nature. It seems clear that once the winning firm
has been awarded its patent, it would like to behave like the monopoly
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inventor and develop the invention to the actvial profit maxiiDizing level.
Indeed, Scherer (1969) reports that the majority of expenditures on R&D
occur at the development, or innovation, level. Apparently in K-S, the
firm ignores the fact that at its winning level of R&D the marginal
revenue from an extra dollar of investment is greater than the marginal
cost; rivalry diminishes the size of the R&D project and hence the
patented final process improvement.
Secondly, the K-S model specifies the degree of rivalry as an exo-
geneous parameter. Ihe simultaneity problem is obvious; in a model
designed to find the optimal duration of patent life under rivalry, one
can hardly ignore the effect of patent length on the degree of rivalry
itself.
The present model specifies a different inventor-innovation endeavor:
a two stage process. The first stage describes the competition to win
the patent while the second stage allows the winner to develop the patent
to the privately optimal I* just as the monopolist did earlier.
A, The Process of Rivaliry
The existence of rivalry will alter the social optimization problem.
Rivalry produces duplicative costs in terms of the expenditures made by
losers. This rent erosion will cause net producer's surplus to diminish.
The exact degree of this rent erosion will be established in what follows.
The presence of entry Cabsent in the K-S formulation) is a key factor
in determination of the amount of rent erosion.
Assume that firms attempting to gain a patent expend some amount to
enter the patentee selection process. Only one firm can win the patent
but many firms can enter the "lottery" by buying a "ticket." For example.
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such tickets may be the salary of bright yoimg physicists. The research
procedure is assumed svibject to some stochastic variation; one firm will
win the patent but we do not know a priori which firm. Each firm picks
a method toward achieving the level of invention that is sufficient to
be awarded a patent. There are many such paths (tickets), each of which
are independent and have the same expected value and cost. Ihe cost
is given as some constant, y» which is the sunk cost of proceeding
to the goal of a patentable development. We assume a winner emerges
early; y is a small percentage of the final level of R&D chosen by
the winner. All losers are denied protection and thus lose the entirety
of their investment, y. After the winner has been chosen, it goes on
in the second stage, spending the additional (I* - y) to arrive at the
profit maximizing level of investment in R&D.
The equilibrium condition in the invention innovation market requires
that the discounted value of expected profits equals zero; if discounted
expected profits are greater than zero, entry into the market for inven-
tion will occur. All firms are assumed to know the profit accruing to
a winner and the number of firms striving to win. Since we assume that
all paths toward winning are of equal expected value, all potential in-
g
ventors are identical. We can then write the probability that firm
i will be the successful inventor as
P = l/n
9
where n is the number of firms in the competition for the patent.
Each firm realizes that it will expend the additional (I* - y) if it
wins the patent. Discounted expected profits can now be written as
-26-
ClO) TT^ = pR - p(I* - y)
-,Y
where, as before, R is the monopoly Inventors discounted rents and the
(I* - y) is the extra I the winning firm will have to make past y if
it wishes to maximize profits.
The eqxiilibrium condition can now be written as (10) = 0; rewriting
this gives
(11) ir^ = p(R - (I* - y))
-Y .
If TT is greater than zero, entry into the inventive process will occtor,
increasing n and lowering p. The value of R and I* will be unaffected
by the degree of rivalry as they are functions of the extent of patent
protection; regardless of the size of n, the winner of the patent will
choose the I* and get the same R as in the monopoly model (given the
same T) . The degree of rivalry is determined by solving (11) for the
equilibrium number of firms, n*. Knowing n* it is possible to evaluate
the size of duplicative R&D expenditures. That is, the rent erosion
due to rivalry is (n* - 1)y» the total value of losing attenqjts.
Recalling that producer surplus P is singly the present discounted
value of the monopoly inventor's profits, R - I*, we have from (11)
which reduces to
(12) P = (n* -1)y.
At the zero profit equilibrium, the producer surplus earned by the
winner of the patent is entirely eroded by the losers' expenditures in
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attempting to gain the patent. The effect of such rivalry will be to
lower the social welfare associated with any given (I*,T) combination
as net producer surplus is eroded to zero. As in Section I we will
first examine a simple model, turning later to a more generalized version.
A
Additionally, we begin the analysis assuming that T = 0,
B. A Simple Model of Rivalry in Invention
We use the same model as described in Part A of Section I, with the
notable difference of the addition of the rivalry process described above;
consumer and producer surplxis are represented as the areas under the
same curves as in model I. However, the rent erosion brought on by
rivalry will cause net producer surplus to vanish. Given this rent
F«<» 3 J r«pao:V«d
erosion, we can return to Figure 3 and examine the qiiestion of optimal
patent life. Suppose the government decreased the optimal patent life.
Once again, the P curve shifts down while the S curve shifts out. The
positive change in consumer surplus is D + A - C. On the private side.
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the winner of the patent will lose the area A + B but society sees a
simiiltaneous drop in resources spent in rent erosion equal to the area
A + B. Thus there is a zero net effect on the private side. The change
in welfare from a drop in T is now A + D - C, If this is positive, the
decrease in T was in the best interest of society.
Comparing this case with the monopoly case, assume we are cvcrrently
at T_ in Figure 3 which is optimal given no rivalry. This implies
D = C + B, If rivalry were present, a decrease in T-. would result in
a change in welfare equal to A + D - C, However, by the optimality of
T- in the monopoly case this is equal to
(A + C + B - C) = (A + B) > 0.
The conclusion is obvious; in a market with rivalry, the optimal patent
protection is shorter than when no rivalry exists,
C. A More General Model With Rivalry
Incorporating rivalry into the generalized format presented in Part
B, Section I is not difficult with respect to the private sector. Rivalry
does not effect the reaction function used earlier; once the patent has
been conferred, the winner acts exactly as the monopoly inventor in the
previous model. Examination of social utility is somewhat more difficult.
Under conditions of free entry into the inventive process, we saw
that rent erosion offsets the patent holder's profit leaving net producer
surplus at zero. In equilibrium, we know that social welfare will collapse
to the value of consumer surplus. However, this result holds only when
1=1*; that is, when we are on the reaction function constraint. In
constructing an indifference map, we must examine points other than those
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on the reaction function, I* = g(T), Recalling that all rivals are aware
of g(T) and can thus predict the I* and P associated with winning, the
size of duplicative research expenditures are known in advance as
(n* - 1)7. Once the government sets any level of T, the rivalry process
drives duplicative effort to this level. If the winning firm's eventual
R&D is anything other than I*, its rents will be less than P, implying
negative net producer surplus for society.
Once again, consider the situation where social utility is the addi-
tive form of net surplus. Let U = U(S,P) denote the social utility func-
tion in the monopoly inventor model, while W = W(S,P,E) social utility
in the rivalry case where rent erosion (E) is present. W differs from
U by the extent of duplicative R&D. Recalling that the loser's expend-
itures are based entirely upon the optimal I* = g(T) (more accurately,
upon the present discounted value of the profit earned from I*), we can
write the duplicative costs, E, as
(13) E = E(g(T)) E' >
Recalling the assumption of additivity, this gives:
CU) W(S,P,E) = U(S,P) - E(gCT))
A
Several possible cases arise, depending upon the size of T
.
, the natural
protection lag. All but the last case result in the same qualitative
conclusions but each present slightly different indifference maps.
Case 1 T. = 0. In this case, there exists no natural imitation
protection; the private reaction function is not truncated. Begin by
examining the case where the reaction function starts at the origin;
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g(0) = and g' (0) > 0. Given any T > we have I* > which means
that rivalry costs will push W(I.,T.) < U(I,,T.). Differentiating (14),
setting dU = 0, and solving for dl/dT we can examine the slope of the
indifference curves under rivalry as
di s^+Pt-^'s'
(15) ^ = -dT
^i
*
^i
The denominator is identical to that found in the monopoly model for any
given I,T combination (see equation 8), Therefore the indifference curves
become vertical at the same I** for any given T; the ridge lines for the
monopoly and the rivalry case are identical. Since E'g' is a positive
term, we know the nimerator is still everywhere negative as in the earlier
model. Thus the indifference curves in the rivalry framework will change
slope along the same I** line as found earlier.
Additionally, since E'g' > 0, the numerator of (15) is greater
in absolute value than the numerator of (8), This insures that at any
(I. ,T.) combination where I ^ I**(T.) the slope of the indifference
curve associated with W will be steeper than those of U.
Finally, we can picture representative indifference curves by
recalling that g(0) = and g'CO) = 0. This implies that at T =
there are no duplicative R&D expenditures and W = U. In Figure 12, the
indifference curve corresponding to W becomes vertical at the same
I**(T.) as its counterpart representing U. However, the indifference
curve for the U function is flatter than that for the W function at
every other (I,T) combination. Additionally, we know that the U. in-
difference curve represents higher social welfare than the W. shown
in Figure 12. At any T, chosen by the government, the vertical slope
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point, I**(T,), is the same on both indifference maps. However, W < U
at this point due to rent erosion; to keep the same level of social wel-
fare given some I, the government must shorten the period of monopoly
A
protection. Now examine the situation where T = 0, but g(T.) = 0,
< T. < T, This refers to the case where the reaction function
has a horizontal intercept at point T. The analysis is similar to
above except as shown earlier in the monopoly model, the indifference
curves are horizontal for any T less than T. Given some I, varying T
between zero and T brings forth no extra benefit or cost whatsoever;
utility remains constant. Note also that this level of utility is the
same for both models, as no rivalry costs have come into play. However,
for any T > T, the reaction function gives I* > which implies
rivalry in the inventive process. At such a T_ > T the level of
1 will need to be greater in the case of rivalry in order to keep the
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level of W equal to that of U. The indifference curves for W are shown
are always steeper than those for U except at I**(T.), The indif-
ference map for case 2 is shown in Figure 13,
3(oV .^
Fl&.(3
Recognizing that the government should act according to the reaction
fvmction constraint, we should always be operating on indifference curves
not coincident with those derived in Section I; Figure 12 gives a qtialita-
tively representative indifference map of the T. = case. The govern-
ment's optimization problem is the same as in the first section. However,
it is obvious the optimal T in any given market will be lower in the case
of rivalry. Figure 14 shows the reaction fvmction g(T) for some market,
a function unaltered by the degree of rivalry. The optimal patent life
in the monopoly model is point E where g(T) is tangent to the highest
indifference curve corresponding to U(S,P), We have demonstrated above
that at this (I,T) combination, the indifference curve corresponding to
W is steeper than that derived from U. The tangency of gCT) occurs at
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a point B in the rivalry case, necessarily pointing to a lower optimal
T for the Stackelberg leader. Whereas earlier models have found optimal
patent life to be increasing in the degree of rivalry, we find the
opposite.
Case 2: < T, < T* where T* is the optimal T under the monopoly
i m m *^ '^ '
inventor assumption. Once again, we will work in the case where the
reaction function becomes positive at T = e > 0, The situation where
g(T) = for < T < T follows according to the same logic as above. The
A A A
existence of T. > trxmcates the gCT) at T.. However, since T* > T
,
we have a positive patent life such as was depicted in Figure 9, The
existence of a positive level of natural protection will alter the in-
difference map as follows. To begin with examine the configuration in
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Figure 15, where T. is temporarily held at zero. Now, let T become
the positive value X. This implies that altering patent life between
F\G »S"
< T < X will have not effect on the values of S and P; the indifference
curve corresponding to the monopoly situation (i.e., U(S,P)) will become
horizontal at the T. constraint. Figure 16 shows the indifference
FIG- Ife
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curve for U-. now that T = X, Moving to the rivalry case, the indif-
ference curve associated with W'»(=U^) also becomes horizontal at T. = X,
At the point (I^,X), the level of social welfare associated with the
(WS,P,E) function is less than in monopoly. Regardless of the source,
protection of X exists and rivalry will lead to some losing expenditures,
To attain a W^. = U„ given X is the level of protection, I, must be the
level of investment by the winning firm,
A
Recalling that < T. < T* in the present case, we are assumed
that T* is strictly less than T*. Figure (17a) shows the case where
I
f T T* T t:
FIG t7a FtG 17b
there is an interior tangency between g(T) and an indifference curves
in the W(S,P,E) indifference map. The other possible case is that the
optimum is the comer solution where no patent protection is best;
social welfare is maximized where the trxmcated g(T) touches the highest
indifference curve but
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C16) g'(T) < MRS.W
This situation is depicted in Figure (16b), Once again, as in case 1
we can be certain that the optimal patent life in rivalry is at less
than in the case of a monopoly inventor.
A
Case 3 ; T. > T*. This final case is represented in Figure 10.
Here, optimal patent life is zero since its vncons trained value of T*
is less than the natural protection, rendering it ineffective. We are
at a comer solution in both the rivalry and the monopoly case, as shown
by Figure 18.
FIG. IS
A
At this comer solution, ClnfT.) the optimal patent life under either
market structure is zero. Thus, only in this final case is T* as large
as T*. But this is only by defavilt as case 3 represents an industry
where natural protection is so large that no patent protection is ever
warranted.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
Using a generalized reaction format, we have shown that rivalry in
the invention market leads to duplicative research costs not present in
the monopoly inventor model. Rivalry will become more intense, i.e., the
nxjmber of firms entering the race for the patent will increase, until
the present value of espected profit Is driven to zero. Under such
conditions a different, lower, optimal patent life is arrived at than
what resulted from the analysis of the monopoly model. In their study
of rivalry's effect on optimal patent life, Kamien and Schwartz found
the opposite: rivalry points to a longer optimal patent life. This
result follows from their "putty-day" representation of the inventive
process and the ejojgenous nature of rivalry. Rivalry drives the size
of the R&D project down and the winner does not continxie development.
To counter this, their model calls for a longer patent protection to
bring forth larger project size; longer patent protection implies higher
profits to the winner but the intensity of rivalry, and therefore the
individual firms probability of winning, is imchanged due to its exo-
genous nature. By specifying rivalry in a more realistic manner, we
arrive at a shorter patent life in the rivalry model than in the monopoly
model.
Finally a caveat must be noted. In the K-S model, timing of inno-
vation is a factor ambiguously affected by rivalry, whereas our model
has not examined this issue. Our results can, at the very least, be
considered important if for no other reason than their indication of
the sensitivity of optimal patent life to variables that K-S do not
examine. Arguments that the present study is biased as a result of
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ignorance of timing problems are no more important than arguments that
the Kamien and Schwartz model is biased due to the exogenous specifi-
cation of rivalry.
Additionally some concern over the assumption of certainty of
eventual invention may arise. It may indeed be the case that the prob-
ability of eventual invention by some firm is an increasing function
of the degree of rivalry. However, Ippolito (page 17) has shown that,
in general, rivalry implies more social costs through its diminishing
effects on project size and its duplicative costs than the possible
social benefits it provides through increased probability of invention.
This lends little weight to the argument that patent life would be
longer in rivalry as it draws forth more rivalry. In a specification
similar to the model of this essay, Ippolito specified all the uncer^
tainty prior to the patenting and found that rivalry adds only a marginal
degree of certainty to the expected income. With this in mind, it seems
any bias introduced from lack of modeling a certainty effect due to
rivalry is very small.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The qualitative results are not sensitive to this assumption.
Monopoly power rather than competition in the given final product
market would lower the benefits of any given size process improve-
ment. However, the benefits are still there and hold regardless
of the market structure in the invention market.
2. As mentioned above, we assume that MC^ is not so radically lower
than MC„ as to cause the patent monopolist to desire some Q > Q^j.
This means that MC, must fall between KC^ and MC^ in the picture
below since residual MR faced by the patent monopolist is the line
ABCE. Again, violation of this assumption would allow increased
benefits; the model would be the same except for a more complicated
formulation.
a
3. Note that the exogenous development lag has been suppressed as it
offers no qualitative differences. We may imagine that development
compression is very inexpensive so development is reduced to e -> 0.
4. It is not difficult to show that licensing is almost always the
most profitable strategy for a holder of a process improvement
patent in a competitive product market.
5. In modeling the process of rivalry, we draw heavily upon the idezis
presented in Richard Ippolito's working paper.
6. Y need not be a constant; the cost of entering the "race" could
be modeled as 61*, a cost proportional to the eventual size of
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the R&D project. Such a change does not alter the qiialltative con-
cliisionSj only the effects of changes in expected profit on the
equilibrivnn number of firms.
7. It may be that y is not the cost minimizing expenditure to reach
the patentable project size due to increasing compression costs,
etc. However, it can still be the same for all firms, such as is
the case in Loury (1975) . If y is not cost minimizing, then the
additional expenditure may be (I* - y*) where < y* < y* As
will become obvious, this has no qualitative effects on the results
as long as the y> Y* difference Is known, and common.
8. If a firm undertakes more than one path toward inventing the goal
process, it will increase its probability of being the winner.
However, it will also increase its costs in a maimer which makes
one firm undertaking j paths qualitatively identical to j firms
undertaking one path; there are no economies of scale nor exter-
nalities In seeking the patent.
9. As stated above, we assume the probability of someone winning the
patent is one. If, however, the probability is something less than
one, say (fi, then p = <p/n. This does not alter the qualitative
Impact of the model.
10. If, as In footnote 7, we have < y* < Y» the rent erosion is still
complete. To see this, suppose that y = y* + b. Expected profit
will then be
TT^ = p[R - (I* - y*) - y] - (1 - p)y
or
TT^ = p[R - I* - b] - (1 - p)y
Finally, recalling that P = "^ and that R - I* - b is now the
winning firms profits, where d is the compression cost payment,
e IT =0 equilibrium cc
R _ I* _ b = (n* - l)y
we have th ir ondition
or
P = (n* - l)y
APPENDIX A
1, Private Reaction Function .
From the profit equation, we know that MR = MC at maximum profit.
That is,
R3. - Cj. = 0. (A.l)
Differentiating this with respect to T we will be able to determine the
slope of the reaction function: the way privately optimal I changes
when T changes
o
^^h-^1^ „ dl dl
" ^I dT " ^11 dT "^ ^T
" C,dT T II T IT
or
dl* ITC,„
- R,^
dT Rjj. - C (A. 2)
II
From the second order conditions for profit maximization, the denominator
is negative. Since the level of patent protection does not affect mar-
ginal R&D cost, C^_ =0* In addition, we know that as T increases, R^
must increase as for any I the period of monopoly protection is longer:
R_ > 0, An Increase in T will cause the marginal revenue function
to increase for any level of I, as the effects of a change in I are now
felt over a longer period of time. This gives the sign of (A. 2) as
dT - ^ ^'
The firm's reaction function is positive in slope for all < T < <»,
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2. Social Indifference Curves *
From (8) we have the slope of the indifference curve as
dT US + UP ^"^'^^
Initially, we assume that Ug = U- for ease of exposition; as will
be pointed out later, this is not necessary for our results.
Given V„ = Up we can evaluate the sign of (A. 3) as
(S^ + P^
-s-TpT"
From the text, we know that (S„ + P ) is always less than zero. Turning
to the denominator, we know that S_ is always positive for T < <» and P_ —
as I r" !*• However, as I is increased past I*, the negative P- eventually
offsets the positive S_. We know this occurs at I** where I** is defined
as
Sj(I**) + Pj.(I**) = 0.
Thus, the sign of A.3 can be written as
4 dlsign df
-(-) > for I < I**
-(-) < for I > I**
It should be noted that as long as Up >^ Up, this result qualitatively is
unchanged. If, for example, V„ carried a higher weight, then society would
prefer to see consumers receive more of the benefit of invention; that is.
a lower T should be predicted. In fact, U„ > U_ leads to steeper sloped
indifference curves as seen in (A, 3) which will give jvist such a result,
3, The Slope of the Ridge Line ; I** locus.
We know from (A. 3) that the locus of points that make up the I**(T.)
line is the locus of (I,T) combinations where S^ + P^ = 0, Totally dif-
ferentiating this implicit function and solving for dl/dT we will find
the slope of the ridge line:
d(S + P = 0)
dT (^11 ^ hl^ df ^ ^IT ^ ^IT = ° (^-^^
Rearranging (A,4) gives
dl** ^^JT "^ ^IT^
dT = - (S^^ + P^^) (A. 5)
Looking first at the denominator, we know that both S^,. and P-^ are
negative due to the concavity of the benefit fiinction. In the numerator,
we know that P^ > and S^„ < 0, At the margin, a decrease in T
gives an increase in S equal to the loss in P plus the deadweight loss
now retrievable. Thus, the absolute value of the P.„ will be less than
the absolute value of S_ . That is,
(SlT+ V ^°-
Substituting this into (A. 5) we get the sign of the slope of the I** locus as
^^^ = - e < 0.






